R. L. WILDER
[May-June, The author's justification of these inclusions is exceedingly interesting from any point of view, be it philosophical, mathematical or purely logical. Thus, in regard to the choice axiom, after a historical summary of its use, its formulation, and criticisms directed against it, the author maintains "This logical principle has certainly at least a character of evidence and necessity equivalent to that which one attributes to many other axioms that one is accustomed to recognize as indispensable for the foundations of arithmetic, analysis and geometry; it was approved even by one so close to the intuitionist viewpoint as Poincaré. With equal right, then, to that with which one rejects the choice axiom, one could arbitrarily deny other important fundamental principles, and so in the future ban important parts of mathematics." The placing of the choice principle in the axioms is then compared to the assumption of the parallel axioms by the Greeks. This analogy leads the reviewer to wonder if the denial of the choice principle might not lead to fruitful results as did the denial of the parallel axiom. A non-euclidean geometry proved to be a happy conception, and might there not possibly be some significance in a non-Zermeloan Mengenlehre which asserts the existence of sets that cannot be well-ordered?* On a historical basis, at least, one would seem justified in maintaining that the denial of "important fundamental principles" is not necessarily an iconoclasm.
What would probably comprise the tenth lecture (the division of topics occurs in pairs of lectures) is devoted to a discussion of consistence, independence and categoricalness of axiomatic systems in general as well as of the particular system presented for the Mengenlehre. Although the system which Fraenkel gives does away with the existing paradoxes and antinomies, its consistency is an open question. From the point of view of him who accepts the axiomatic foundation this is a great defect-indeed, it can be said that if ever a consistency proof were needed, it is needed in this particular instance, since the very purpose of the adoption of the axiomatic method in this case is to avoid contradiction.
The reviewer heartily recommends these lectures to any who wish a general summary of the state of the "Foundations, " as well as to those who wish a good introduction for mature students. The book is finished off with an unusually complete bibliography comprising eight pages, and this is amplified by up-to-date additions made during the period of proof-reading. R. L. WILDER * See Church, Alternatives to Zermelo's assumption, Transactions of this Society, vol. 29 (1927) , p. 178.
